# Neg V Georgetown EM

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#### Purchase Agreements are not financial incentives

Czinkota 2009 **-** Associate Professor at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University (Michael, Fundamentals of International Business, p. 69)

Financial incentives offer special funding for the investor by providing, for example, land or buildings, loans, and loan guarantees. Non financial incentives include guaranteed government purchases, special protection from competition through tariffs, import quotas, and local content requirements, and investments in infrastructure facilities.

The advantage to our interp is limits- there are almost infinite incentives- only by limiting to financial incentives can the neg have any hope of keeping up with the number of mechanisms- procurement is uniquely bad because it does not require commercialization- key to energy DA’s which are fundamental to the topic- also key to energy market DA’s like electricity prices

#### Other transactions are unlimiting- could be anything- also not for production they are for R and D

Halchin 2010 [L. Elaine Halchin Specialist in American National Government January 27, 2010 “Other Transaction (OT) Authority” Congressional Research Service http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34760\_20100127.pdf]

An other transaction (OT) is a special vehicle used by federal agencies for obtaining or advancing research and development (R&D) or prototypes. An OT is not a contract, grant, or cooperative agreement, and there is no statutory or regulatory definition of "other transaction." Only those agencies that have been provided OT authority may engage in other transactions. OT authority originated with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) when the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 was enacted. Subsequently, seven other specific agencies have been given OT authority: the Department of Defense (DOD), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Transportation Security Administration, Department of Health and Human Services, and Department of Energy. Other federal agencies may use OT authority under certain circumstances and if authorized by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Generally, the reason for creating OT authority is that the government needs to obtain leading-edge R&D (and prototypes) from commercial sources, but some companies (and other entities) are unwilling or unable to comply with the government's procurement regulations. The government's procurement regulations and certain procurement statutes do not apply to OTs, and, accordingly, other transaction authority ...

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#### Hagel confirmed now due to Obama

Norman Birnbaum Prof emeritus @ Georgetown University Law Center 2013-1-20 Global Times http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/756998.shtml | Hagel nomination now likely to be all smooth sailing

With endorsements from two Senators who are voices of the Israel lobby (Barbara Boxer of California and Chuck Schumer of New York), former senator Chuck Hagel is now almost certain of accumulating enough votes to be confirmed as secretary of defense. A certain number of former Republican colleagues and other Republican Senators will vote against him, but it is unlikely that the Republicans will resort to all the available mechanisms for nullifying the candidacy. In the first instance, the decision by the aforementioned Democratic senators is a gesture of solidarity with President Barack Obama and a recognition of the enlarged influence he won with his eletoral victory.

#### Plan costs capital

McEntee 2012 [Christine McEntee Executive Director and CEO, American Geophysical Union August 15, 2012 “Science, Politics and Public Opinion” National Journal http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php?comments=expandall~~%23comments-http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/08/finding-the-sweet-spot-biparti.php?comments=expandall]

We also know that the biggest obstacles to passage of energy and environmental legislation are disagreements about the extent to which the federal government can and should regulate business, and reluctance to launch new initiatives that will add to the deficit. The science tells us that small initiatives that require only nominal investments can't begin to address the environmental and energy challenges we face; and legislation big enough to achieve significant results will cost more than Congress is willing to spend.

#### PC key to Hagel

SCOTT WONG and MANU RAJU, 1/6/13, “Chuck Hagel takes fire from Capitol Hill,” Politico, http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/chuck-hagel-takes-fire-from-capitol-hill-85805.html

Senate Democrats and Republicans are far from sold on President Barack Obama’s expected nomination of Chuck Hagel as secretary of defense. In fact, Obama’s decision to tap the Vietnam veteran and outspoken former Republican senator is likely to spark another nasty fight with Congress right on the heels of the fiscal cliff showdown and just before another likely battle royal over the debt ceiling. Republicans on Sunday unleashed a fresh barrage of attacks amid reports Obama would nominate Hagel on Monday for the top job at the Pentagon. The new Senate minority whip, Texas Republican John Cornyn, said he’s firmly against Hagel’s nomination. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), an Air Force reservist who serves on the Armed Services Committee that will consider the nod, said Hagel would hold the “most antagonistic” views toward Israel of any defense secretary in U.S. history. And despite heaping praise on Hagel when he retired from the Senate after the 2008 elections, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) on Sunday failed to extend an olive branch to the Nebraska Republican, instead suggesting there would be “tough questions” ahead. Even Senate Democrats are privately signaling they‘re not yet on board with the Hagel pick, and that the White House has a lot of work to do to get him across the finish line. The nomination comes at a tricky time for the administration — just as the fights over raising the debt ceiling and government appropriations are set to begin. And it could put a number of at-risk or pro-Israel Democrats in tough political spots — especially if the nomination fight grows even more contentious. Democrats are also scratching their heads over why Obama appears willing to go to the mat for Hagel, while abandoning his push for a close friend and member of his inner circle, U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, to become secretary of state. Rice, an unabashed Democrat, abandoned her bid after withering GOP criticism over the deadly attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Libya. Though different in substance, the controversy over Rice’s remarks is not unlike the current pushback over Hagel’s past foreign policy positions and controversial remarks. But Hagel lacks a natural constituency in the Senate, given that he’s grown alienated from the GOP, yet Democrats are suspicious of his record. “It is a strange signal for the White House to send that they are willing to fight for Hagel but not Rice,” one Senate Democratic aide said Sunday. “Democrats are not currently unified behind Hagel, and it will take some real work by the administration to get them there, if it’s even possible.” Senior Republicans agreed, noting that after Hagel infuriated Republicans and Democrats alike over the years, there isn’t a natural base for him. “I can’t imagine why [Obama] would choose to burn his political capital on this nomination. For what? There is no constituency for Chuck Hagel,” one senior GOP aide said. “Obama will expend every ounce of political capital he has to get him across the finish line. Dems will hate this.”

#### Hagel breaks the Washington consensus – averts Iran war

Rosie Gray and Zeke Miller, writers for Buzzfeed, 1/6/2013 “Obama Upends Iran Debate By Picking Chuck Hagel,” http://www.buzzfeed.com/rosiegray/obama-updends-iran-debate-by-picking-chuck-hagel)

Their hope — and their foes’ fear — is that Hagel’s confirmation could mean that views outside what is considered the mainstream on Israel and Iran begin to replace the more hawkish Washington consensus. A Hagel confirmation could change the terms of the debate on the Middle East by challenging the Republican Party with the views of one of its own. And Hagel, a Republican whose views were altered by the Iraq war, has the potential to affect the prospect of a war with Iran, some argue. Administration officials, in public and in private, do not make this case, though they say they’re eager to engage the debate. “If the Republicans are going to look at Chuck Hagel, a decorated war hero and Republican who served two terms in the Senate, and vote no because he bucked the party line on Iraq, then they are so far in the wilderness that they’ll never get out,” said one administration official. The official also contested the notion that the choice Hagel — who voted in the Senate against Iran sanctions — means anything in particular about the Administration’s policy on Iran. “Senator Hagel supports the President's sanctions regime on Iran, and has always said that all options should be on the table, including military force as a last resort,” the official said, also saying that Hagel “will continue to carry out President Obama’s unprecedented security cooperation with Israel.” But the way in which the lines have been drawn means that — whatever Hagel’s role in making policy — the fight over his confirmation will shape it. A bipartisan coalition of pro-Israel members of Congress and activists, as well as allies with other agendas, helped derail the nomination of a career diplomat with friendly relationship with Arab regimes, Chas Freeman, to an obscure intelligence advisory council. If you aren't listening closely, it can be difficult to detect the gaps between Barack Obama's eagerness to avoid the use of force with Iran; the somewhat noisier concerns of Senate Democrats about Iran's nuclear program; and the sense among some Republicans and some Israeli leaders that American bombs should start falling now.

#### Extinction

Chossudovsky, 12/26/2011 (Michel, Preparing to attack Iran with Nuclear Weapons, Global Research, p. http://globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=28355)

An attack on Iran would have devastating consequences, It would unleash an all out regional war from the Eastern Mediterranean to Central Asia, potentially leading humanity into a World War III Scenario. The Obama Administration constitutes a nuclear threat. NATO constitutes a nuclear threat Five European "non-nuclear states" (Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Turkey) with tactical nuclear weapons deployed under national command, to be used against Iran constitute a nuclear threat. The Israeli government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not only constitutes a nuclear threat, but also a threat to the security of people of Israel, who are misled regarding the implications of an US-Israeli attack on Iran. The complacency of Western public opinion --including segments of the US anti-war movement-- is disturbing. No concern has been expressed at the political level as to the likely consequences of a US-NATO-Israel attack on Iran, using nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear state. Such an action would result in "the unthinkable": a nuclear holocaust over a large part of the Middle East.

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#### Text: The Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy should research and develop Small Modular Reactor technology for the Department of Defense.

#### The Department of Defense should only procure energy that is cost competitive.

#### Solves the case

Hayward 2010 (Steven Hayward, AEI Resident Scholar, Mark Muro, Brookings Institute Metropolitan Policy Program, Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, Breakthrough institute cofounders, October 2010, “Post-Partisan Power,” thebreakthrough.org/blog/Post-Partisan Power.pdf)

In addition to fostering stronger linkages between government-funded research centers and private sector investors, entrepreneurs, and customers, the DOD can work to more closely connect research efforts and the growing energy innovation needs of the U.S. military.¶ This close relationship between research efforts and DOD procurement and technology needs was central to the successful history of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), famous for inventing the Internet, GPS, and countless other technologies that have both improved the fighting capabilities of the U.S. military and launched many spin-off technologies American consumers and businesses now take for granted. DARPA program managers had a keen awareness of the technologies and innovations that could improve military capabilities and funded breakthrough innovations aligned with those needs. Once innovations matured into potentially useful technologies, the DOD was there as an early customer for these products, allowing entrepreneurial firms to secure market demand, scale-up production, and continue to improve their products.¶ Congress made the right move in creating and funding an Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy (ARPA-E) program modeled after the historic success of DARPA. ARPA-E resides within the DOE, however, which is not set up to be a major user of energy technologies. By contrast, DOD has both the opportunity and the urgent need to use many of these technologies.64 The DOD can and should play a greater role in administering ARPA-E and making sure that breakthrough energy discoveries become real- world technologies that can strengthen American energy security, enhance the capabilities of the U.S. military, and spin off to broader commercial use.¶ Fiscal year 2011 funding requests for the ARPA-E program are currently a modest $300 million, just one- tenth the annual budget for DARPA research.65 Truly bringing the DARPA model to the energy sector would imply scaling ARPA-E up to match DARPA. Given the multi-trillion dollar scale of the energy industry, only funding levels on this order of magnitude will have a significant impact on the pace of energy innovation and entrepreneurship.¶ We recommend scaling up funding for ARPA-E over the next five years to $1.5 billion annually, with a significant portion of this funding dedicated to dual-use energy technology innovations with the potential to enhance energy security and strengthen the U.S. military. DOD and DOE should extend and expand their current Memorandum of Understanding, established in July 2010,66 and launch an active partnership between ARPA-E and DOD to determine and select nascent dual-use breakthrough energy innovations for funding through the ARPA-E program and potential adoption and procurement by the DOD.

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#### The affirmative’s takes part in the naturalization of the military as the optimal mode of politics- this creates a Clauswitzian political sphere where war is the only political choice

Robert P. Marzec, rmarzec@purdue.edu, is Associate Professor of English literature and postcolonial studies at Purdue University, and associate editor of Modern Fiction Studies The Global South Volume 3, Number 1, Spring 2009 “Militariality” Project Muse

These stratocratic controls of planetary human activity reveal more than the ideology of a single administration; they are an extension of what we can now see as the complete devotion to an apparatus that captures all cultural and political energies in terms of what Clausewitz defined as "policy." The original state of "emergency" as defined by the Bush Administration in the wake of the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks has been naturalized and sedimented as to become a fundamental starting point of human existence. Consequently, understanding the full intensity of the age of militariality requires more than the common critical awareness of Clausewitz's central doctrine: "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means" (28). It requires first an understanding that for Clausewitz, war is the very ontological basis of human existence, a basis that transcends culture, history and temporality. War defines the very structure of human subjectivity, a juridico-natural "code of law" that is "deeply rooted" in a people, an army, a government: "war is a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy" (30). Clausewitz assigns a constituency to each of the registers of this trinity: "The first of these…mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government" [End Page 143] (30). In a totalizing problematic organized according to the idea of war serving as the basis of human existence, the people of a nation are equated with that of a blind primordial force of violence: "the first," which refers to "primordial violence, hatred, and enmity" identifies the people living in the nation. "Government" therefore names that entity constituted for the exclusive purpose of controlling its unstable citizenry by reorienting the energies of the people towards warfare. This reorientation lays the groundwork and delineates the horizon of human creativity, and determines the single legitimized space of freedom: the army, where the "creative spirit is free to roam." The space of instability, of chance, which is the condition for the possibility of creativity, enters into the war-footing picture of reality only on this register of militarized human activity. This connection here is not a matter of association; military activity defines the very essence of freedom and human creativity. The army and its state are not defined in this picture in traditional terms of democracy, protection, and service to a people. Nor are they the a sign of the discourse of biopower, for biopower has its eyes on the productivity of a population and functions according to a general administration of life that, although affecting "distributions around a norm," still invites and produces a certain amount of heterogeneity (Foucault 266). The army and the state are instead named as the necessary foundational machinic force that determines the war footing constitution of humanity, ensuring that all its energies are channeled in a single direction: "The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the people" (Clausewitz 31). The government and the army, in fact, only arise and become increasingly indispensable as the movement of humans through history becomes more "civilized" and "intellectually developed": "In any primitive, warlike race, the warrior spirit is far more common than among civilized peoples. It is possessed by almost every warrior: but in civilized societies only necessity will stimulate it in the people as a whole, since they lack the natural disposition for it" (45). This explains the constant disdain for "intellectuals," for they are understood to be part of the general problem of the so-called civilizing process, the "general intellectual development of a given society" (45, italics in original). This intellectual development is a double-edged sword for Clausewitz and the war-footing polity. On the one hand Clausewitz must have access to at least a modicum of classificatory procedures, otherwise he would not be able to establish the lesser other whose constitution makes possible the essential act of war. On the other hand the non-primitive human consciousness must acquire "appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament" and not be distinguished by "great power(s) of meditation" (44, 48). Instead what is needed is "mental force," a "firmness" of opinion that does not waver: "We say a man has strength of character, or simply has character, if he sticks to his convictions….Such firmness cannot show itself, of course, if a man keeps changing his mind" (54, [End Page 144] emphasis in original).11 This affects the realm of knowledge production as well, for "Knowledge in war is very simple"; and a "high degree of education" simply leads to "ridiculous pedantry" (96, 95, emphasis in original). It is not that life and the political have collapsed in the total politicization of life, as Agamben argues, or not solely. This collapse is only one of the outcomes of the total militarization of the biopolitical settlement, of the bios. The civil bios has no role in this problematic; it does not even exist. In this characterization war, and not biopower, becomes the very basis of the political: "war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse"; "The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it" (28, 29). We can see the full manifestation of Clausewitz's polity as war in the truth-statements of militariality advocates. "Step 8" of War Footing, is clear: "Wage Political Warfare" (136). A month after 9/11 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld launched the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI). The OSI is "a component of a broader, government-wide strategic communications campaign, specifically [designed] to assist government agencies in crafting policy regarding the military aspects of information operations" (139). The program was shut down, but its advocates make it clear that it should be revived as soon as possible, on the grounds that its tight connection between information and militarization can bring about the planned unidirectional metaphysical orientation of warfare with greater speed than any other approach. Militariality sets up a program for direct political warfare and stands that against the "far more limited effort known as 'public diplomacy'": "even when they are well conceived and well executed...public diplomacy strategies will be a long-term effort. This is in their nature, given the reliance they place on such instruments as international media programming, exchange visits of political and cultural figures, humanitarian and development assistance, training future leaders, and so forth. Such efforts take years....And we do not have the luxury of time" (141). The suggestions for a plan of action include the immediate execution of a political warfare strategy, the drafting of legislative vehicles for political warfare, the strengthening of CIA clandestine services, the housing of the primary responsibility for political warfare in the Department of Defense, and the direct use of the Internet as a tool of political warfare (143–145). The consequences to be drawn from all of this are severe. Information in the post-9/11 state of constant "emergency" generated by the government of the Bush administration and its war footing organizations must now be identified as organizing not only the general political arrangement of life but the greater and more amorphous register of civil existence as well. It is in this sense that we are witnessing the creation of a new World Stratocratic Picture, a new totality, one that has its telos in the total control of the totality (the subtext of the above passage concerning diplomacy is its dependency on an actual engagement with an international community, a dependency that violates the [End Page 145] unilateral orientation adhering to the decision-making process of the military polity). In the creation of a totality capable of being totally controlled the indissoluble connection between the political and the civil changes dramatically. It can no longer be said that the civil is indirectly tied to the political. The line between the two may never have been solid, but in the "state of exception," which installs a justification for acting "outside the normal order" of a democratic polity, sites of human production, knowledge, information, media reports, entertainment, the Internet, defense, militarization, representation, and human consciousness itself, all flow in and out of one another so as to confuse any possibility of making clear distinctions between them. The political regime, progressively acting directly on the civil register, diminishes the civil register to the point of its eventual erasure. With the erosion of the civil register it becomes clearer that metamilitarization appears increasingly as an essential technique of the polity rather than an exceptional measure. A war footing philosophy thus becomes the very constitutive paradigm of remaining popular civil institutions such as the media and film production. Sound bite culture is only one sign of this.

#### This creates the psychological priming for conflict- most probable explanation for why we go to war

Scheper-Hughes and Bourgois ‘4 (Prof of Anthropology @ Cal-Berkely; Prof of Anthropology @ UPenn) (Nancy and Philippe, Introduction: Making Sense of Violence, in Violence in War and Peace, pg. 19-22)

This large and at first sight “messy” Part VII is central to this anthology’s thesis. It encompasses everything from the routinized, bureaucratized, and utterly banal violence of children dying of hunger and maternal despair in Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33) to elderly African Americans dying of heat stroke in Mayor Daly’s version of US apartheid in Chicago’s South Side (Klinenberg, Chapter 38) to the racialized class hatred expressed by British Victorians in their olfactory disgust of the “smelly” working classes (Orwell, Chapter 36). In these readings violence is located in the symbolic and social structures that overdetermine and allow the criminalized drug addictions, interpersonal bloodshed, and racially patterned incarcerations that characterize the US “inner city” to be normalized (Bourgois, Chapter 37 and Wacquant, Chapter 39). Violence also takes the form of class, racial, political self-hatred and adolescent self-destruction (Quesada, Chapter 35), as well as of useless (i.e. preventable), rawly embodied physical suffering, and death (Farmer, Chapter 34). Absolutely central to our approach is a blurring of categories and distinctions between wartime and peacetime violence. Close attention to the “little” violences produced in the structures, habituses, and mentalites of everyday life shifts our attention to pathologies of class, race, and gender inequalities. More important, it interrupts the voyeuristic tendencies of “violence studies” that risk publicly humiliating the powerless who are often forced into complicity with social and individual pathologies of power because suffering is often a solvent of human integrity and dignity. Thus, in this anthology we are positing a violence continuum comprised of a multitude of “small wars and invisible genocides” (see also Scheper- Hughes 1996; 1997; 2000b) conducted in the normative social spaces of public schools, clinics, emergency rooms, hospital wards, nursing homes, courtrooms, public registry offices, prisons, detention centers, and public morgues. The violence continuum also refers to the ease with which humans are capable of reducing the socially vulnerable into expendable nonpersons and assuming the license - even the duty - to kill, maim, or soul-murder. We realize that in referring to a violence and a genocide continuum we are flying in the face of a tradition of genocide studies that argues for the absolute uniqueness of the Jewish Holocaust and for vigilance with respect to restricted purist use of the term genocide itself (see Kuper 1985; Chaulk 1999; Fein 1990; Chorbajian 1999). But we hold an opposing and alternative view that, to the contrary, it is absolutely necessary to make just such existential leaps in purposefully linking violent acts in normal times to those of abnormal times. Hence the title of our volume: Violence in War and in Peace. If (as we concede) there is a moral risk in overextending the concept of “genocide” into spaces and corners of everyday life where we might not ordinarily think to find it (and there is), an even greater risk lies in failing to sensitize ourselves, in misrecognizing protogenocidal practices and sentiments daily enacted as normative behavior by “ordinary” good-enough citizens. Peacetime crimes, such as prison construction sold as economic development to impoverished communities in the mountains and deserts of California, or the evolution of the criminal industrial complex into the latest peculiar institution for managing race relations in the United States (Waquant, Chapter 39), constitute the “small wars and invisible genocides” to which we refer. This applies to African American and Latino youth mortality statistics in Oakland, California, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. These are “invisible” genocides not because they are secreted away or hidden from view, but quite the opposite. As Wittgenstein observed, the things that are hardest to perceive are those which are right before our eyes and therefore taken for granted. In this regard, Bourdieu’s partial and unfinished theory of violence (see Chapters 32 and 42) as well as his concept of misrecognition is crucial to our task. By including the normative everyday forms of violence hidden in the minutiae of “normal” social practices - in the architecture of homes, in gender relations, in communal work, in the exchange of gifts, and so forth - Bourdieu forces us to reconsider the broader meanings and status of violence, especially the links between the violence of everyday life and explicit political terror and state repression, Similarly, Basaglia’s notion of “peacetime crimes” - crimini di pace - imagines a direct relationship between wartime and peacetime violence. Peacetime crimes suggests the possibility that war crimes are merely ordinary, everyday crimes of public consent applied systematic- ally and dramatically in the extreme context of war. Consider the parallel uses of rape during peacetime and wartime, or the family resemblances between the legalized violence of US immigration and naturalization border raids on “illegal aliens” versus the US government- engineered genocide in 1938, known as the Cherokee “Trail of Tears.” Peacetime crimes suggests that everyday forms of state violence make a certain kind of domestic peace possible. Internal “stability” is purchased with the currency of peacetime crimes, many of which take the form of professionally applied “strangle-holds.” Everyday forms of state violence during peacetime make a certain kind of domestic “peace” possible. It is an easy-to-identify peacetime crime that is usually maintained as a public secret by the government and by a scared or apathetic populace. Most subtly, but no less politically or structurally, the phenomenal growth in the United States of a new military, postindustrial prison industrial complex has taken place in the absence of broad-based opposition, let alone collective acts of civil disobedience. The public consensus is based primarily on a new mobilization of an old fear of the mob, the mugger, the rapist, the Black man, the undeserving poor. How many public executions of mentally deficient prisoners in the United States are needed to make life feel more secure for the affluent? What can it possibly mean when incarceration becomes the “normative” socializing experience for ethnic minority youth in a society, i.e., over 33 percent of young African American men (Prison Watch 2002). In the end it is essential that we recognize the existence of a genocidal capacity among otherwise good-enough humans and that we need to exercise a defensive hypervigilance to the less dramatic, permitted, and even rewarded everyday acts of violence that render participation in genocidal acts and policies possible (under adverse political or economic conditions), perhaps more easily than we would like to recognize. Under the violence continuum we include, therefore, all expressions of radical social exclusion, dehumanization, depersonal- ization, pseudospeciation, and reification which normalize atrocious behavior and violence toward others. A constant self-mobilization for alarm, a state of constant hyperarousal is, perhaps, a reasonable response to Benjamin’s view of late modern history as a chronic “state of emergency” (Taussig, Chapter 31). We are trying to recover here the classic anagogic thinking that enabled Erving Goffman, Jules Henry, C. Wright Mills, and Franco Basaglia among other mid-twentieth-century radically critical thinkers, to perceive the symbolic and structural relations, i.e., between inmates and patients, between concentration camps, prisons, mental hospitals, nursing homes, and other “total institutions.” Making that decisive move to recognize the continuum of violence allows us to see the capacity and the willingness - if not enthusiasm - of ordinary people, the practical technicians of the social consensus, to enforce genocidal-like crimes against categories of rubbish people. There is no primary impulse out of which mass violence and genocide are born, it is ingrained in the common sense of everyday social life. The mad, the differently abled, the mentally vulnerable have often fallen into this category of the unworthy living, as have the very old and infirm, the sick-poor, and, of course, the despised racial, religious, sexual, and ethnic groups of the moment. Erik Erikson referred to “pseudo- speciation” as the human tendency to classify some individuals or social groups as less than fully human - a prerequisite to genocide and one that is carefully honed during the unremark- able peacetimes that precede the sudden, “seemingly unintelligible” outbreaks of mass violence. Collective denial and misrecognition are prerequisites for mass violence and genocide. But so are formal bureaucratic structures and professional roles. The practical technicians of everyday violence in the backlands of Northeast Brazil (Scheper-Hughes, Chapter 33), for example, include the clinic doctors who prescribe powerful tranquilizers to fretful and frightfully hungry babies, the Catholic priests who celebrate the death of “angel-babies,” and the municipal bureaucrats who dispense free baby coffins but no food to hungry families. Everyday violence encompasses the implicit, legitimate, and routinized forms of violence inherent in particular social, economic, and political formations. It is close to what Bourdieu (1977, 1996) means by “symbolic violence,” the violence that is often “nus-recognized” for something else, usually something good. Everyday violence is similar to what Taussig (1989) calls “terror as usual.” All these terms are meant to reveal a public secret - the hidden links between violence in war and violence in peace, and between war crimes and “peace-time crimes.” Bourdieu (1977) finds domination and violence in the least likely places - in courtship and marriage, in the exchange of gifts, in systems of classification, in style, art, and culinary taste- the various uses of culture. Violence, Bourdieu insists, is everywhere in social practice. It is misrecognized because its very everydayness and its familiarity render it invisible. Lacan identifies “rneconnaissance” as the prerequisite of the social. The exploitation of bachelor sons, robbing them of autonomy, independence, and progeny, within the structures of family farming in the European countryside that Bourdieu escaped is a case in point (Bourdieu, Chapter 42; see also Scheper-Hughes, 2000b; Favret-Saada, 1989). Following Gramsci, Foucault, Sartre, Arendt, and other modern theorists of power-vio- lence, Bourdieu treats direct aggression and physical violence as a crude, uneconomical mode of domination; it is less efficient and, according to Arendt (1969), it is certainly less legitimate. While power and symbolic domination are not to be equated with violence - and Arendt argues persuasively that violence is to be understood as a failure of power - violence, as we are presenting it here, is more than simply the expression of illegitimate physical force against a person or group of persons. Rather, we need to understand violence as encompassing all forms of “controlling processes” (Nader 1997b) that assault basic human freedoms and individual or collective survival. Our task is to recognize these gray zones of violence which are, by definition, not obvious. Once again, the point of bringing into the discourses on genocide everyday, normative experiences of reification, depersonalization, institutional confinement, and acceptable death is to help answer the question: What makes mass violence and genocide possible? In this volume we are suggesting that mass violence is part of a continuum, and that it is socially incremental and often experienced by perpetrators, collaborators, bystanders - and even by victims themselves - as expected, routine, even justified. The preparations for mass killing can be found in social sentiments and institutions from the family, to schools, churches, hospitals, and the military. They harbor the early “warning signs” (Charney 1991), the “priming” (as Hinton, ed., 2002 calls it), or the “genocidal continuum” (as we call it) that push social consensus toward devaluing certain forms of human life and lifeways from the refusal of social support and humane care to vulnerable “social parasites” (the nursing home elderly, “welfare queens,” undocumented immigrants, drug addicts) to the militarization of everyday life (super-maximum-security prisons, capital punishment; the technologies of heightened personal security, including the house gun and gated communities; and reversed feelings of victimization).

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative. This rejection opens up spaces to create discourses alternative to the American exceptional military project

Robert P. Marzec, rmarzec@purdue.edu, is Associate Professor of English literature and postcolonial studies at Purdue University, and associate editor of Modern Fiction Studies The Global South Volume 3, Number 1, Spring 2009 “Militariality” Project Muse

All of these transformations owe their existence, of course, to a long and complex history that cannot be articulated in the space available here. The cords of militariality extend back to a number of historical developments in ontological thought, judiciary systems, agricultural reorganizations, sovereign displacements, national reterritorializations, economic restructurings, and the colonial expansions that have generated today's international community. These cords are more difficult to see than those present in the stratocracy itself—one fact of militariality's character that opens a pathway for a real awareness of its increasing excessiveness and thus the potential for resistances to develop across ethnic, religious, and national lines. The paradox of militariality's strength and simultaneous fragility is precisely this visible excessiveness, which is part of its self-destructive essence. The greater problem is in some sense the development of a general awareness of those previously-existing discourses of modern liberal humanism that so easily establish, time and again, the stratocratic polities of the modern era. Even so, the visible nature of these cords of militariality—its direct daylight attacks on and incarcerations of foreign and domestic constituencies, its fully mediatized legal signings, its denouncements of the educational system and the international community—should not be understood as lacking in power. Any criticism of militariality will need to take into consideration the heavy economic, material, and faith-based investments in its project and continual existence. These investments hide the stratocracy's hysterization of the [End Page 147] polity with the general concept of necessity: it is necessary to take this action because we are under attack.12 But, if it still can be said that democracy owes its existence to the kind of interrogative thinking that challenges the unrelenting necessities forced on human existence, then it may come to be known that necessity will be the end of democracy, and the constabularies of militariality the architects of this end.

### Heg Adv

#### Grid resilient- Even worst case scenario it doesn’t hurt the military

Lewis 2010 (James Andrew Lewis, senior fellow and director of the Technology and Public Policy Program CSIS, March 2010, “The Electrical Grid as a Target for Cyber Attack,” http://csis.org/files/publication/100322\_ElectricalGridAsATargetforCyberAttack.pdf)

This conclusion is different from the strategic consequences on a cyber attack on the power grid. The United States routinely suffers blackouts. The nation does not collapse. In the short term, military power and economic strength are not noticeably affected - a good example for opponents to consider is Hurricane Katrina, which caused massive damage but did not degrade U.S. military power in or even long-term economic performance. Is there any cyber attack that could match the hurricane?¶ The United States is a very large collection of targets with many different pieces making up its electrical infrastructure. While a single attack could interrupt service, the large size and complexity of the American economy make it more resilient. Even without a Federal response plan, the ability of electrical companies to work quickly together to restore service is impressive and we should not underestimate the ingenuity of targets to recover much more rapidly than expected. This is a routine occurrence in aerial bombing: impressive damage is quickly rectified by a determined opponent.

#### Heg doesn’t solve war

Barbara Conry (former associate policy analyst, was a public relations consultant at Hensley Segal Rentschler and an expert on security issues in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia at the CATO Institute) and Charles V. Pena (Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute as well as a senior fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser on the Straus Military Reform Project at the CATO Institute) 2003 “47. US Security Strategy” CATO Handbook for Congress, http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-47.pdf

Another rationale for attempting to manage global security is that a world without U.S. hegemony would soon degenerate into a tangle of chaos and instability, in which weapons proliferation, genocide, terrorism, and other offensive activities would be rampant. Prophets of such a development hint that if the United States fails to exercise robust political and military leadership today, the world is condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes of the 20th century—or perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is seriously flawed. First, instability in the international system is nothing new, and most episodes do not affect U.S. vital interests. Furthermore, to assert that U.S. global leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global chaos vastly overstates the power of any single country to influence world events. Indeed, many of the problems that plague the world today, such as civil wars and ethnic strife, are largely impervious to external solutions. There is little to back up an assertion that only Washington’s management of international security can save the world from political, economic, or military conflagration.

#### International system resilient – no conflict

Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 “U.S. Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose?” http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-power-preeminence-for-what-purpose/

Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the world’s indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose — or gain — the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe. The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

### Warming Adv

#### DoD OTA authority expires in September – they don’t fiat renewal – no long term solvency

R E P O R T OF THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON H.R. 1585 May 11, 2007 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-110hrpt146/html/CRPT-110hrpt146.htm

TITLE VIII--ACQUISITION POLICY, ACQUISITION MANAGEMENT, AND RELATED

 MATTERS

 ITEMS OF SPECIAL INTEREST

Section 816--Extension of Authority to Carry Out Certain Prototype

 Projects

 This section would extend the time frame in which the

Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of each military

department may enter into ``Other Transactions'' in carrying

out certain prototype R&D projects. The authority under this

section is extended until September 30, 2013.

#### Can’t solve- we’d need 20 a year immediately

Daniel Botkin is a scientist who studies life from a planetary perspective, a biologist who has helped solve major environmental issues, and a writer about nature, degrees in physics and biology, “Can Nuclear Energy Solve Our Energy Crisis?,” October 21, 2007, http://www.danielbbotkin.com/2007/10/21/can-nuclear-energy-solve-our-energy-crisis/, accessed 7-7-2012.

We would need too many nuclear plants. In the United States, 104 operating nuclear power reactors at 65 sites provide 8% of our energy, while fossil fuels provide 85%. For nuclear power to completely replace fossil fuels, we would need more than 1,000 new nuclear power plants of the same designs and efficiencies as existing plants. This would mean an average of 20 new plants per state. Today, fossil fuels provide 71.4% of the electricity produced in the United States, while nuclear power plants provide 19.4%. Just to replace the electrical generation by fossil fuels with nuclear energy would require 285 new nuclear power plants of the kind, size, and efficiency of those in use now, and to counteract global warming these would have to be built and put online within a few years. This is just not practical.

#### Makes it worse

Caldicott 6 (Helen, “Nuclear power is not the answer to global warming or anything else”, p.4)

What exactly is nuclear power? It is a very expensive, sophisticated, and dangerous way to boil water. Uranium fuel rods are placed in water in a reactor core, they reach critical mass, and they produce vast quantities of heat, which boils the water. Steam is directed through pipes to turn a turbine, which generates electricity. The scientists who were involved in the Manhattan Project creating nuclear weapons developed a way to harness nuclear energy to generate electricity. Because their guilt was so great, they were determined to use their ghastly new invention to help the human race. Nuclear fission harnessed “atoms for peace,” and the nuclear PR industry proclaimed that nuclear power would provide an endless supply of electcitiy – referred to as “sunshine units” – that would be good for the environment and “too cheap to meter.” They were wrong. Although a nuclear power plant itself releases no carbon dioxide, the production of nuclear electricity depends upon a vast, complex, and hidden industrial infrastructure that is never featured by the nuclear industry in its propaganda, but that actually releases a large amount of carbon dioxide as well as other global warming gases. One is led to believe that the nuclear reactor stands alone, an autonomous creator of energy. In fact, the vast infrastrcutre necessary to create nuclear energy, called the nuclear fuel cycle, is a prodigious user of fossil fuel and coal. The production of carbon dioxide (CO2) is one measurement that indicates the amount of energy used in the production of the nuclear fuel cycle. Most of the energy used to create nuclear energy – **to mine uranium ore for fuel, to crush and mill the ore, to enrich the uranium, to create the concrete and steel for the reacotr, and to store the thermally and radioactively hot nuclear waste** – comes from the consumption of fossil fuels, that is coal or oil. When these materials are burned to produce energy, they form CO2 (reflecting coal and oil’s origins in ancient trees and other organic carboniferous material laid down under the earth’s crust millions of years ago). For each ton of carbon burned, 3.7 tons of CO2 gas added to the atmosphere, and thisis the source of today’s global warming.

Oceans resilient

Easterbrook 1995—Gregg Easterbrook, Distinguished Fellow, Fullbright Foundation, A Moment on Earth pg 25

In the aftermath of events such as the Love Canal or the Exxon Valdez oil spill, every reference to the environment is prefaced with the adjective "fragile." "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. The environment that contains them is close to indestructible. The living environment of Earth has survived ice ages; bombardments of cosmic radiation more deadly than atomic fallout; solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion; thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory; reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains; fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still. Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape. Human assaults on the environment, though mischievous, are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.

#### Assign warming zero percent probability – flawed models and predictions

Craig D. Idso (founder and chairman of the board of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change) and Sherwood B. Idso (president of the Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide and Global Change) February 2011 “Carbon Dioxide and Earth’s Future Pursuing the Prudent Path” http://www.co2science.org/education/reports/prudentpath/prudentpath.pdf

As presently constituted, earth’s atmosphere contains just slightly less than 400 ppm of the colorless and odorless gas we call carbon dioxide or CO2. That’s only four-hundredths of one percent. Consequently, even if the air's CO2 concentration was tripled, carbon dioxide would still comprise only a little over one tenth of one percent of the air we breathe, which is far less than what wafted through earth’s atmosphere eons ago, when the planet was a virtual garden place. Nevertheless, a small increase in this minuscule amount of CO2 is frequently predicted to produce a suite of dire environmental consequences, including dangerous global warming, catastrophic sea level rise, reduced agricultural output, and the destruction of many natural ecosystems, as well as dramatic increases in extreme weather phenomena, such as droughts, floods and hurricanes. As strange as it may seem, these frightening future scenarios are derived from a single source of information: the ever-evolving computer-driven climate models that presume to reduce the important physical, chemical and biological processes that combine to determine the state of earth’s climate into a set of mathematical equations out of which their forecasts are produced. But do we really know what all of those complex and interacting processes are? And even if we did -- which we don't -- could we correctly reduce them into manageable computer code so as to produce reliable forecasts 50 or 100 years into the future? Some people answer these questions in the affirmative. However, as may be seen in the body of this report, real-world observations fail to confirm essentially all of the alarming predictions of significant increases in the frequency and severity of droughts, floods and hurricanes that climate models suggest should occur in response to a global warming of the magnitude that was experienced by the earth over the past two centuries as it gradually recovered from the much-lower-than-present temperatures characteristic of the depths of the Little Ice Age. And other observations have shown that the rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations associated with the development of the Industrial Revolution have actually been good for the planet, as they have significantly enhanced the plant productivity and vegetative water use efficiency of earth's natural and agro-ecosystems, leading to a significant "greening of the earth." In the pages that follow, we present this oft-neglected evidence via a review of the pertinent scientific literature. In the case of the biospheric benefits of atmospheric CO2 enrichment, we find that with more CO2 in the air, plants grow bigger and better in almost every conceivable way, and that they do it more efficiently, with respect to their utilization of valuable natural resources, and more effectively, in the face of environmental constraints. And when plants benefit, so do all of the animals and people that depend upon them for their sustenance. Likewise, in the case of climate model inadequacies, we reveal their many shortcomings via a comparison of their "doom and gloom" predictions with real-world observations. And this exercise reveals that even though the world has warmed substantially over the past century or more -- at a rate that is claimed by many to have been unprecedented over the past one to two millennia -- this report demonstrates that none of the environmental catastrophes that are predicted by climate alarmists to be produced by such a warming has ever come to pass. And this fact -- that there have been no significant increases in either the frequency or severity of droughts, floods or hurricanes over the past two centuries or more of global warming -- poses an important question. What should be easier to predict: the effects of global warming on extreme weather events or the effects of elevated atmospheric CO2 concentrations on global temperature? The first part of this question should, in principle, be answerable; for it is well defined in terms of the small number of known factors likely to play a role in linking the independent variable (global warming) with the specified weather phenomena (droughts, floods and hurricanes). The latter part of the question, on the other hand, is ill-defined and possibly even unanswerable; for there are many factors -- physical, chemical and biological -- that could well be involved in linking CO2 (or causing it not to be linked) to global temperature. If, then, today's climate models cannot correctly predict what should be relatively easy for them to correctly predict (the effect of global warming on extreme weather events), why should we believe what they say about something infinitely more complex (the effect of a rise in the air’s CO2 content on mean global air temperature)? Clearly, we should pay the models no heed in the matter of future climate -- especially in terms of predictions based on the behavior of a non-meteorological parameter (CO2) -- until they can reproduce the climate of the past, based on the behavior of one of the most basic of all true meteorological parameters (temperature). And even if the models eventually solve this part of the problem, we should still reserve judgment on their forecasts of global warming; for there will yet be a vast gulf between where they will be at that time and where they will have to go to be able to meet the much greater challenge to which they aspire

#### No exports – regulations

**Dolley 2012** (Steven Dolley, Managing Editor of Inside NRC, Platts Nuclear, October 1, 2012, “Export reform needed to increase US nuclear market share: NEI,” http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/ElectricPower/6666149)

Export controls on technology related to nuclear power should be reformed to allow US companies to capture a larger share of growing international markets, the Nuclear Energy Institute said Monday. The US Department of Commerce estimates the world market for nuclear power technology, fuel and related services and equipment at "upwards of" $750 billion over the next 10 years, Richard Myers, vice president for policy development, planning and supplier programs at NEI, said at a press conference Monday in Washington to release a report the US nuclear power industry commissioned on the topic. "It is a myth that the US nuclear supply chain has disappeared," Myers said. Most manufacturing of large "heavy metal" components for nuclear power plants, such as reactor vessels, is now done in Asia, but many US firms manufacture "precision components" for the nuclear industry and would stand to benefit from increased ability to compete with other countries, Myers said. US licensing and regulatory reviews of nuclear exports, however, are "unduly burdensome," have confusing "layers of jurisdiction" shared by at least four federal agencies, and typically take at least a year to complete, "months longer" than reviews in other exporter countries, he said. As a result, the US export control regime is "far more complex and more difficult to navigate ... than comparable regimes in other nations," Myers said. The report prepared by the law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman for NEI said that "US agencies should be able to increase the efficiency of their license processing through stronger executive branch procedures. By signaling to potential customers that US exports may be licensed on a schedule comparable to those of foreign export control regimes, such an improvement could significantly 'level the playing field' for US exporters in the near term." Many such reforms can be accomplished "administratively," without the need for legislation, James Glasgow, a partner at Pillsbury who specializes in nuclear export law, said during the press conference. The US Department of Energy is currently amending some of its export regulations, known as the Part 810 rule, and reforming that rule could provide significant opportunities to US exporters, Glasgow said. Unfortunately, some of DOE's proposed revisions to the rule go in the wrong direction, adding regulatory requirements and hurdles, Myers said. Some potential customers for US nuclear exports see DOE's Part 810 review as "the choke point" for an order, and "sometimes that's an evaluation criterion" for deciding whether to buy from a US firm, Glasgow said. In such situations, delay in the review can be "the functional equivalence of denial" of permission for the export because the buyer looks elsewhere, he said.

### UAV Adv

#### Nuclear balance of power is stable now- shifts cause doctrine changes that cause crisis instability

**Elkind ’12** (David J. is a research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues “American Nuclear Primacy: the End of MAD or a New START?” May 22 http://csis.org/blog/american-nuclear-primacy-end-mad-or-new-start)

These results show that the United States cannot reasonably claim to have obtained nuclear primacy. Reductions in the two nations’ respective arsenals, coupled with the large number of Russian targets collaborate to make it exceptionally difficult to destroy the Russian arsenal in a counterforce first strike. Even though my results demonstrate a modest level of confidence in the baseline scenario, I believe that mutually assured destruction remains in place. Because the costs of even a single Russian warhead surviving would have such devastating consequences for the United States, I do not believe that any President or military planner would care to wager America’s most populous cities in conducting a nuclear first strike. While these results speak to the purely military considerations of that choice, the political, ethical and humanitarian considerations likewise make such an action highly unlikely. Even though this article concludes that the US could not carry out a counterforce strike on the Russian arsenal in 2012, and therefore does not possess nuclear primacy, this should not be interpreted as a call to restart the arms race or otherwise acquire primacy. Liber and Press write that “the shift in the nuclear balance could significantly damage relations among the great powers and increase the probability of nuclear war,” and outline a variety of possible mechanisms by which this could come to pass and present rebuttals to counterarguments (interested readers should refer to Lieber and Press, “The End of MAD?” 31-38). To bridge the gap in nuclear capabilities, Russia and China may undertake perilous activities to restore the nuclear balance, such as pre-delegated launch authority, a launch-on-warning posture, or larger nuclear arsenals. Pre-delegated launch authority increases the risk of unauthorized nuclear use; Cold War experience confirms that launch-on-warning postures are vulnerable to false alarms initiating a counter-attack to imaginary missiles; arms races carry the risk that one side will perceive that it has gained the upper hand and undertake a nuclear first use. Furthermore, nuclear primacy carries considerable risks in times of crisis. In the event of a political crisis or a conventional war between the US and a rival power, the threat of a disarming strike by the United States may predispose the rival to land the first blow while it still has the means to do so. In this way, having a reduced confidence in the ability of the US to carry out a first strike should be read as a stabilizing feature of international politics, as strategic stability (if it had ever departed) has been restored as a pillar of the international system. External to these considerations, achieving nuclear primacy would be a pyrrhic victory. The preceding analysis assumes that the United States is in possession of perfect intelligence on the locations and attributes of Russian nuclear weapons facilities and is able to carry out such an attack unhindered by air- or missile-defenses (and concludes such an attack is ill-advised despite possessing perfect information). Even if mobile missiles do not continuously patrol, it would make sense for Russia to shuttle them from one garrison to another in order to decrease Russia’s opponents’ confidence in accounting for all of them. Furthermore, Russia’s decision to deploy its mobile forces in the event of a crisis (or continuously as a matter of policy) could spark concerns in Washington that either a Russian attack is immanent or simply that United States’ confidence in a first-strike option has evaporated, creating further perceptions of insecurity and upsetting the strategic environment which, in the mind of US policymakers, has assumed nuclear primacy. What’s more, mobile deployments are a cheap, easy countermeasure that would effectively negate the confidence gained (such as any is gained) from believing that the United States has nuclear primacy. Achieving, and then maintaining, a position of primacy introduces several significant strategic concerns of its own, and would hardly enhance the security of the United States or the international system. I would like to advance this line of argumentation one step further. If this model accurately reflects reality and a Liber and Press-style counterforce strike on Russia’s nuclear arsenal is unlikely to succeed, then deep cuts to the nuclear arsenal and the decision to abandon counterforce targeting gains credibility. That is, deep cuts to the nuclear arsenal would not mean abandoning counterforce doctrine because that has already happened. Simply put, attempting the counterforce attack would include an inescapable risk to the United States – and we can rest easier knowing that this is the case.

#### Conventional Weapons solve deterrent effects

**Gerson ‘9** (CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE RETHINKING U.S. NUCLEAR POSTURE MODERATOR: JAMES ACTON, ASSOCIATE, NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT SPEAKERS: MICHAEL S. GERSON, RESEARCH ANALYST, CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C.

The National Academy of Sciences report on the future of U.S. nuclear weapons policy advocated “no first use.” Again, along these lines that the major conventional threat had disappeared, therefore we didn’t need to rely on the threat of nuclear weapons to deter – to help to bolster deterrence of a conventional attack. **Moreover, the conventional capability – U.S. conventional superiority demonstrated so well in the first Gulf War** **made it such that conventional capabilities were absolutely sufficient for deterrence**. Even Paul Nitze, one of the architects of NSC- 68 in 1994 asked “is it time to junk our nukes?” His argument was **smart conventional weapons should be the principal U.S. deterrent. They’re safer, they cause less collateral damage, they provide more flexibility, there’s less risk of escalation, and perhaps most importantly, they’re highly credible**. So **people who had once concocted rather elaborate scenarios for nuclear war-fighting came around to this view, that smart conventional weapons would be the principal deterrent**, whereas those in favor of no-first-use advocated one set of use.

#### Nuclear Primacy is bad though

#### Primacy increases likelihood of nuclear war

Charles L. Glaser is Professor and Deputy Dean of the Irving B. Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago, and Steve Fetter is Professor and Dean of the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 84–126

Although U.S. damage-limitation capabilities would provide these foreign policy benefits, they would also bring significant risks. Most basic, the ability of the United States to pursue its foreign policy interests more assertively could increase the probability that an adversary will use nuclear weapons against it. By promising to reduce U.S. vulnerability, counternuclear threats could make the United States willing to engage in certain conflicts that it would otherwise avoid and to bargain harder in others. Although the balance of resolve would shift toward the United States, there could be cases in which the probability that an adversary will escalate to nuclear attack also increases. This can occur when the shift in the balance of resolve increases uncertainty about which state’s resolve is greater.54 The somewhat counterintuitive result is that while enhanced counternuclear capabilities strengthen the willingness of the United States to pursue its interests, they can also increase the probability that the United States or its allies will suffer a nuclear attack. In cases in which this is not true, U.S. counternuclear capabilities either are insufficient to restore leeway to the United States’ foreign policy or unnecessary because it already enjoys a large advantage in resolve. In addition, there is some danger that the United States will exaggerate the effectiveness of its counternuclear capabilities and, as a result, run an unjustifiably high risk of suffering a nuclear attack. As stressed earlier, for counternuclear attacks to be effective, the United States would require excellent intelligence on the location and operation of the adversary’s nuclear force. U.S. leaders who fail to appreciate uncertainties in U.S. intelligence might launch a nuclear attack that was much less likely to be effective than they believed. It is essential that U.S. leaders be fully informed about the likely effectiveness of U.S. counternuclear capabilities, including not only uncertainty about U.S. weapons systems, but also uncertainty about U.S. intelligence concerning the adversary’s force deployments and operations. Any biases in the U.S. system that exaggerate the overall effectiveness of U.S. damage-limitation capabilities could lead to unwarranted assertiveness and the accompanying risks of nuclear attack

Counterforce leads to accidental launch

Harold Feiveson, ed., The Nuclear Turning Point: A Blueprint for Deep Cuts and De-alerting of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1999).

Counterforce doctrine increases the risk of accidental or erroneous strikes. A policy of targeting opposing nuclear forces for rapid destruction puts pressure on the other side to be ready at all times to launch vulnerable forces (particularly ICBMs and pier-side SLBMs) on short notice before they are destroyed. This hair-trigger posture could lead to a launch of Russian nuclear forces in response to a false warning or a massive U.S. response to a small accidental or unauthorized Russian attack. A doctrine that provides for the rapid launch of nuclear forces during peacetime simply cannot be justified in the post—cold war security environment where the probability of an accidental, unauthorized, or erroneous launch is far greater than the probability of a deliberate nuclear attack. Even an option to launch under attack is unwise because it forces political and military leaders to make momentous decisions in a few minutes with incomplete information on the nature or origin of the attack.

#### It only takes one mishap cause escalation

Scott Sagan (professor of political science and co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation) 1993 “The Limits of Safety” p. 101

There was also at least some risk that the accidental detonation of one nuclear weapon might lead, through some mixture of unanticipated events, to further accidents. The Join chiefs specifically addressed the question of rules of engagement for US interceptors during the crisis and ordered that conventional armaments only were to be used against any soviet or Cuban aircraft entering airspace over the southeaster United States in response to a US invasion of Cuba. The JCS reminded NORAD and the ADC on October 28, however, that the usual authority and rules of engagement for all other US interceptor forces were still in effect: “if the pattern of actions elsewhere in the NORAD…system indicated the existence of a Cuban and Sino-Soviet attack, nuclear weapons could be used to destroy hostile aircraft. The following hypothetical scenario is not implausible in this highly complex and tightly coupled system. Imagine an accidental nuclear detonation inside the United States: it could be produced by a SAC bomber crash, mishandling of a weapon at an air force base, or an inadvertent use of an interceptor’s nuclear air-to-air missile. Under such conditions, communications might be impaired by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or other nuclear weapon’s effects, and any lower-level commander in the vicinity of the detonation might see this as unambiguous evidence that a soviet attack was under way. If the deputy for operations in the regional command post held this belief, he could, acting fully within his proper authority, order interceptors to use nuclear weapons against any suspected incoming hostile aircraft. The danger of “ambiguous command” could also become severe under these circumstances: if an airborne interceptor pilot witnessed a nuclear burst in the distance, couldn’t not establish radio contact with base command posts, and believed a hostile aircraft was approaching in range, what would be the appropriate response? The possibility that one accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon could lead to further accident escalation cannot therefore be entirely ruled out.

#### We already can do nuclear forensics

Anders **Corr** is a Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Government, Harvard University 8/11/**2004** “Retaliation Against Nuclear Terror: A Negligence Doctrine” based upon work supported under a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship.

In order to track the provenance of fissile material after a terrorist attack, human intelligence and forensic evidence can be marshaled. Tagging technologies that currently exist can be used to read a nuclear signature post-explosion. Fissile material processing techniques leave unique chemical compounds that make traceable the provenance of fissile material coming from not only a particular processing facility, but even each run at each processing facility. The Department of Defense’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the Department of Energy’s Stockpile Stewardship Program have revived programs for fissile identification, both in matching dust samples from known nuclear tests stretching back to the 1940s and developing new forensic techniques.7 President George W. Bush’s proposal to limit the nuclear fuel cycle to a select group of states will also limit the number of suspects and the availability of technology, and could allow for the comprehensive tagging of new fissile materials and verifiable tracking of the movement of those tagged materials. Existing tags could not be removed by smugglers or terrorists without prohibitively technical reprocessing equipment. Neither will most smugglers or terrorists have an incentive to remove tags unless they fear that assets hit in retaliation are assets that they value. The IAEA currently holds a sample bank of fissile materials, and post-explosion samples can be compared against these databanks. It is possible that no evidence of a particular state’s involvement will be found post-explosion. In this case, the United States could still retaliate in order to deter future attacks, proliferation, and lax security standards. Not to retaliate would be to encourage further nuclear terrorism. Retaliation in the case of no evidence ought to be specified publicly in advance, so as to take advantage of deterrence, and ought to list targets, such as states that are rogue nuclear proliferators or that do not abide by international standards of fissile material storage. By having the technology and intelligence resources necessary to enable the head of state to reasonably infer the negligent state responsible, but at the same time promising to retaliate whether or not the particular negligent state can be found, improves the credibility of the threat.

#### No Middle East Escalation

Steven A. Cook (fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations) Ray Takeyh (fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations) and Suzanne Maloney (senior fellow at Saban Center) June 28 2007 “Why the Iraq war won't engulf the Mideast”, International Herald Tribune

Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly straightforward. First, Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition, which, if the conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700 kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally, there is no precedent for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The civil war in Lebanon was regarded as someone else’s fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the borders of Iraq. The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.

#### No nuclear terrorism –statistically insignificant cumulative probability

John Mueller (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University) 2010 “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda” p, 187-190

Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative-though it is done all the time in cost-benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists' favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 13-1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the 20 hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion specifically 3.486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same-or even smaller. There may be a few barriers, such as numbers 13 or absolute loyalty trump the one oftechnical competence. This would increase the chances that the bomb-making enterprise would go undetected, while at the same time decreasing the likelihood that it would be successful. However, given the monumentality of the odds confronting the would-be atomic terrorist, adjustments for such issues are scarcely likely to alter the basic conclusion. That is, if one drastically slashed the one in 3.5 billion estimate a thousandfold, the odds of success would still be one in 3.5 million. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive. Getting away from astronomical numbers for a minute, Levi points out that even if there are only ten barriers and even if there were a wildly favorable 80 percent chance of overcoming each hurdle, the chance of final success, following the approach used here, would only be 10 percent. Faced even with such highly favorable odds at each step, notes Levi, the wouldbe atomic terrorist might well decide "that a nuclear plot is too much of a stretch to seriously try." Similarly, Jenkins calculates that even if there are only three barriers and each carried a 50/50 chance of success, the likelihood of accomplishing the full mission would only be 12.5 percent.14 Odds like that are not necessarily prohibitive, of course, but they are likely to be mind-arrestingly small if one is betting just about everything on a successful outcome. Multiple Attempts The odds considered so far are for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front, he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults. IS However, few, if any, groups appear to have any interest whatever in striking the United States except for al-Qaeda, an issue to be discussed more fully in the next chapter. But even setting that consideration aside, the odds would remain long even with multiple concerted attempts.16 If there were a hundred such efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one in over 10,000 at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three, it would be about one in nearly 35 million. If there were 1,000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be worse than one in a thousand at the SO/50 level and one in nearly 3.5 million at the one in three level.I7 Of course, attempts in the hundreds are scarcely realistic, though one might be able to envision a dozen or so. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Furthermore, each foiled attempt would likely expose flaws in the defense system, holes the ...,. defenders would then plug, making subsequent efforts that much more dif• ficult. For example, when the would-be peddler of a tiny amount of pur loined highly enriched uranium was apprehended in 2006, efforts were made to trace its place of origin using nuclear forensics. IS ." Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by ... self-interested governments. Already, for example, by all accounts Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were 10 or ~, .-s 15 years ago.19

# 2NC

## CP

#### No part of an OTA deals with production of energy. One type of OTA can just call for broadening knowledge about a topic, another is just for acquiring prototypes.

GPO, HEARING ¶ BEFORE THE¶ SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING ¶ THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, ¶ AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ¶ OF THE¶ COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY ¶ HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ¶ ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS ¶ SECOND SESSION ¶ FEBRUARY 7, 2008 http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg44511/pdf/CHRG-110hhrg44511.pdf

OTA applies only two types of awards at DHS. One award is ¶ known as other transactions for research, which are typically used ¶ for basic, applied or advanced research. This type of transaction does not call for a deliverable product but rather provides a support ¶ to broaden the homeland technology knowledge base. ¶ The other award is known as other transactions for prototypes, ¶ which are used to help the Department develop or acquire a prototype.

#### Even if they partially meet For is a term of exclusion – means the Aff is at best extra topical

US CUSTOMS COURT 39 AMERICAN COLORTYPE CO. v. UNITED STATES C. D. 107, Protest 912094-G against the decision of the collector of customs at the port of New York UNITED STATES CUSTOMS COURT, THIRD DIVISION 2 Cust. Ct. 132; 1939 Cust. Ct. LEXIS 35

The same reasons used by the appellate court may be adopted in construing the language of the statute herein involved. If the words "for industrial use" mean no more than the words "articles of utility," there could be no reason for inserting the additional words "for industrial use" in the paragraph. Therefore, it must be held that the [\*135] new language "for industrial use" was intended to have a different meaning from the words "articles of utility," as construed in the case of Progressive Fine Arts Co. v. United States, [\*\*8] supra. Webster's New International Dictionary defines the word "industrial" as follows: Industrial. 1. Relating to industry or labor as an economic factor, or to a branch or the branches of industry; of the nature of, or constituting, an industry or industries \* \* \* . The transferring of the scenes on an oil painting to a printed copy is a branch of industry under the definition above quoted. Some of the meanings of the preposition "for" signify intent, as shown by the following definition in the same dictionary: For. 2. Indicating the end with reference to which anything is, acts, serves, or is done; as: a. As a preparation for; with the object of; in order to be, become, or act as; conducive to. \* \* \*. d. Intending, or in order, to go to or in the direction of. Therefore, the words "articles for industrial use" in paragraph 1807 imply that Congress intended to exclude from that provision articles either purchased or imported with the intention to use the same in industry for manufacturing purposes.

#### R&D doesn’t directly affect energy production- there are a laundry list of goals they can affect, ensures underlimiting

EIA 7 (Energy Information Administration, "Federal Energy Research and Development," http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/servicerpt/subsidy2/pdf/execsum.pdf)

Research and Development (R&D). Federal R&D spending focuses on a variety of goals, such as increasing U.S. energy supplies, or improving the efficiency of various energy production, transformation, and end-use technologies. **R&D expenditures do not directly affect** current **energy production** and prices, but, if successful, they could affect future production and prices.

## T

### 2NC Limits Links

#### An other transaction agreement can literally take an unlimited number of forms.

FPDS.gov, no date https://www.fpds.gov/help/Create\_an\_OTAgreement.htm

Create an Other Transaction (OT) Agreement¶ Introduction¶ A transaction other than a procurement contract, grant, or cooperative agreement. Since this type of transaction is defined in the negative, it could take an unlimited number of potential forms. The statutory authority authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security to enter into transactions other than procurement contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements, in carrying out activities that:¶ Support basic, applied, and advanced research and development that would promote homeland security;¶ Advance the development, testing and evaluation, and deployment of critical homeland security technologies;¶ Accelerate the prototyping and deployment of technologies that would address homeland security vulnerabilities.¶ "Other transactions" is the term commonly used to refer to the instruments authorized by 10 USC 2371 and employed under the authority granted above. In exercising this authority, DHS may use two major types of OT’s: OT’s for Research and OT’s for Prototype Projects.

### 2NC Limits Overview

#### Literally doubles the educational benefit

**Arrington 2009** (Rebecca, UVA Today, “Study Finds That Students Benefit From Depth, Rather Than Breadth, in High School Science Courses” March 4)

A recent study reports that high school students who study fewer science topics, but study them in greater depth, have an advantage in college science classes over their peers who study more topics and spend less time on each. Robert Tai, associate professor at the University of Virginia's Curry School of Education, worked with Marc S. Schwartz of the University of Texas at Arlington and Philip M. Sadler and Gerhard Sonnert of the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics to conduct the study and produce the report. "Depth Versus Breadth: How Content Coverage in High School Courses Relates to Later Success in College Science Coursework" relates the amount of content covered on a particular topic in high school classes with students' performance in college-level science classes. The study will appear in the July 2009 print edition of Science Education and is currently available as an online pre-print from the journal. "As a former high school teacher, I always worried about whether it was better to teach less in greater depth or more with no real depth. This study offers evidence that teaching fewer topics in greater depth is a better way to prepare students for success in college science," Tai said. "These results are based on the performance of thousands of college science students from across the United States." The 8,310 students in the study were enrolled in introductory biology, chemistry or physics in randomly selected four-year colleges and universities. Those who spent one month or more studying one major topic in-depth in high school earned higher grades in college science than their peers who studied more topics in the same period of time. The study revealed that students in courses that focused on mastering a particular topic were impacted twice as much as those in courses that touched on every major topic

#### Turns their offense—limits are vital to creativity and innovation

David Intrator (President of The Creative Organization) October 21, 2010 “Thinking Inside the Box,” http://www.trainingmag.com/article/thinking-inside-box

One of the most pernicious myths about creativity, one that seriously inhibits creative thinking and innovation, is the belief that one needs to “think outside the box.” As someone who has worked for decades as a professional creative, nothing could be further from the truth. This a is view shared by the vast majority of creatives, expressed famously by the modernist designer Charles Eames when he wrote, “Design depends largely upon constraints.” The myth of thinking outside the box stems from a fundamental misconception of what creativity is, and what it’s not. In the popular imagination, creativity is something weird and wacky. The creative process is magical, or divinely inspired. But, in fact, creativity is not about divine inspiration or magic. It’s about problem-solving, and by definition a problem is a constraint, a limit, a box. One of the best illustrations of this is the work of photographers. They create by excluding the great mass what’s before them, choosing a small frame in which to work. Within that tiny frame, literally a box, they uncover relationships and establish priorities. What makes creative problem-solving uniquely challenging is that you, as the creator, are the one defining the problem. You’re the one choosing the frame. And you alone determine what’s an effective solution. This can be quite demanding, both intellectually and emotionally. Intellectually, you are required to establish limits, set priorities, and cull patterns and relationships from a great deal of material, much of it fragmentary. More often than not, this is the material you generated during brainstorming sessions. At the end of these sessions, you’re usually left with a big mess of ideas, half-ideas, vague notions, and the like. Now, chances are you’ve had a great time making your mess. You might have gone off-site, enjoyed a “brainstorming camp,” played a number of warm-up games. You feel artistic and empowered. But to be truly creative, you have to clean up your mess, organizing those fragments into something real, something useful, something that actually works. That’s the hard part. It takes a lot of energy, time, and willpower to make sense of the mess you’ve just generated. It also can be emotionally difficult. You’ll need to throw out many ideas you originally thought were great, ideas you’ve become attached to, because they simply don’t fit into the rules you’re creating as you build your box.

### A2: Limits Out Military Affs

#### For example solar and wind purchasing

**Wald 11** (Matthew L., writer on energy policy for thirty years for the NY Times, February 4, 2011, “Clean-energy firms, find private investors; projects aided by grants from U.S. attract $4 for every $1 taxpayers spent,” The International Herald Tribune, lexis)

In late 2009, the U.S. government gave $151 million in grants to advance 37 clean-energy ideas deemed too radical or too preliminary to attract much private financing - like electricity storage that mimics photosynthesis and batteries that double or triple the amount of energy they can store.¶ Since then, six of the projects have made enough progress to attract $108 million in private venture capital financing - about four private dollars for every dollar that the taxpayers spent to get them rolling - the Department of Energy was to announce Thursday.¶ While none of the projects are expected to result in commercial products for years to come, the Obama administration is emphasizing the early signs of success as it seeks to persuade a sometimes skeptical Congress to approve more money for clean-energy innovation.¶ Success is probably 10 to 20 years away, said Arun Mujamdar, director of the program, which is called the Advanced Research Projects Agency-Energy. But the private investment is ''a good sign, an endorsement of some sort,'' he said. ''The best thing the government can do is to catalyze investment.''¶ While 31 projects have not yet attracted outside help, all are continuing, according to the department. Josh Lerner, a professor at Harvard Business School and an expert on venture capital, said he would have been surprised if most of the projects had quickly attracted private financing. If all the projects had quickly drawn private money, it would have suggested that the projects would have happened without government intervention, Mr. Lerner said.¶ With a track record of 6 of 37 being picked up, ''it's hard not to feel it's a reasonable indicator that they're doing something right,'' he said.¶ While the government took ownership stakes in automakers and banks that got taxpayer help, it has not done so with the energy companies it has financed through the program, known as ARPA-E, so taxpayers reap no direct benefits.¶ Congress modeled the program after the better-known Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, or Darpa, which provided early seed money for the Internet and sponsored competitions to build sophisticated robotic vehicles, among other projects. Most of Darpa's projects fail to produce commercial products, but the basic research it finances has sometimes led to breakthroughs.¶ For the first round of ARPA-E projects, the Energy Department focused on wind and solar energy production, energy storage and the capture and storage of carbon dioxide. No carbon storage project attracted outside investment, in part because investors no longer expect a government cap on carbon dioxide emissions to help drive demand. But sun and wind power and storage technologies did lure investors.¶ Envia Systems, which received $4 million in government money, used a material licensed from Argonne National Laboratory to build a better cathode, or negative terminal, for a battery. Envia, which is based in Newark, California, recently signed a contract with General Motors to begin delivery in 2014 of a material that will let batteries store roughly twice as much electricity per kilogram compared with the batteries now going into the Chevrolet Volt, said Michael Sinkula, a co-founder of the company.¶ Envia recently raised $17 million from an alliance of investors that included G.M., and it is now pursuing research on a better anode, or positive terminal, which will yield an even bigger improvement in the weight-to-energy ratio, Mr. Sinkula said.¶ Another battery company, 24M, a spinoff of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and A123 Systems, got a $2.55 million government grant and took in $10 million in venture capital money. It is also working on a lithium-ion battery with much higher energy density.¶ A solar cell company, 1366 Technologies, got $4 million from ARPA-E and has raised $33.4 million in private money. 1366, based in Lexington, Massachusetts, casts silicon wafers, a basic building block of solar cells, directly into their final form, which is 0.008 inch thick. That 0.2-millimeter cast cuts the price of the finished solar cells about 40 percent, the company said.¶ Sun Catalytix, of Cambridge, Massachusetts, uses a catalyst to help break up water molecules when they are exposed to electric current. The hydrogen from the water is absorbed by other molecules into an energy-rich material that can be burned in an internal combustion engine or converted back into electricity, said Amir Nashat, who is the acting chief executive of the company and also a principal in the venture capital firm Polaris Venture Partners.¶ Polaris and others, including Tata of India, put $9.5 million into the company after it got a $4 million ARPA-E grant. But Sun Catalytix is still years from releasing a product, Mr. Nashat said.¶ The two other companies financed by ARPA-E that attracted private investment were General Compression, which is developing a demonstration plant for a method to store electricity for later use and leveraged a $750,000 grant into $12 million in private capital; and FloDesign, which is working on a more efficient wind turbine based on the design of jet engines and used its $8.3 million grant to eventually raise another $27 million.

#### Or nuclear powered subs

O'Rourke 2012 [Ronald O'Rourke ¶ Specialist in Naval Affairs ¶ April 2, 2012 Congressional Research Service “Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack ¶ Submarine Procurement: Background and ¶ Issues for Congress” http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32418.pdf]

The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget requests $3,217.6 million in procurement funding to ¶ ¶ complete the procurement cost of the 17¶ ¶ th¶ ¶ and 18¶ ¶ th¶ ¶ Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered ¶ ¶ attack submarines. The FY2013 budget estimates the combined procurement cost of these two ¶ ¶ boats at $5,107.9 million, and the ships have received a total of $1,890.3 million in prior-year ¶ ¶ advance procurement (AP) and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding. The Navy’s proposed ¶ ¶ FY2013 budget also requests $874.9 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured ¶ ¶ in future years. The Navy’s proposed FY2013 budget defers the scheduled procurement of one ¶ ¶ Virginia-class boat from FY2014 to FY2018. ¶ ¶ The two Virginia-class boats requested for procurement in FY2013 are the final two in a group of ¶ ¶ eight covered by a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement for the period FY2009-FY2013. ¶ ¶ The Navy this year is requesting congressional approval for a new MYP arrangement that would ¶ ¶ cover the next nine Virginia-class boats scheduled for procurement in FY2014-FY2018 (in annual ¶ ¶ quantities of 1-2-2-2-2). ¶ ¶ The Department of Defense (DOD) announced in January 2012 that it wants to build Virginiaclass boats procured in FY2019 and subsequent years with an additional mid-body section, called ¶ ¶ the Virginia Payload Module (VPM), that contains four large-diameter, vertical launch tubes that ¶ ¶ the boats would use to store and fire additional Tomahawk cruise missiles or other payloads, such ¶ ¶ as large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs). Building Virginia-class boats with the ¶ ¶ VPM might increase their unit procurement costs by about 15%-20%, and would increase the ¶ ¶ total number of torpedo-sized weapons (such as Tomahawks) that they could carry by about 76%. ¶ ¶ The Navy’s FY2013 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be sufficient to ¶ ¶ maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run. The Navy projects under that plan ¶ ¶ that the SSN force would fall below 48 boats starting in FY2022, reach a minimum of 43 boats in ¶ ¶ FY2028-FY2030, and remain below 48 boats through FY2034.

#### Or maybe they could buy domestic oil, natural gas or CTL

Buis and Clark 2012 [Tom Buis CEO, Growth EnergyGrowth Energy Board Co-Chair Gen. Wesley K. Clark (Ret.) May 23, 2012 The National Journal “American Families Need American Fuel” http://energy.nationaljournal.com/2012/05/powering-our-military-whats-th.php]

Even worse, according to a new Bloomberg Government analysis, Pentagon spending on fuel is dramatically increasing. This will force the military to dedicate even more funds toward energy costs, at the expense of other priorities, like training and paying soldiers. In fact, every $.25 increase in the cost of jet fuel makes a $1 billion difference in the Department of Defense’s bottom line – a debt that will be passed along to the American taxpayer.¶ And if that's not enough to make you want to avoid foreign oil, then consider this: every dollar hike in the international, politically-rigged price of oil hands Iran about $3 million more per day, that their regime can use to sow mischief, fund terrorism, and develop missiles and nuclear weapons.¶ Enough is enough! We have domestic alternatives that can protect American interests, and promote prosperity and security – including, more domestic oil production, using natural gas and biofuels, like ethanol, as fuel, converting coal to liquid fuel, and moving as rapidly as possible to vehicles powered by green energy.

## UAV

### Link

#### Intel increases nuke primacy- lack of clarity about where things are is why we don’t first strike

Jan **Lodal** is immediate past President of the Atlantic Council of the United States and was a senior U.S. Defense Department and White House official in the administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford and Bill Clinton. The Counterforce Fantasy. Foreign Affairs, 00157120, Mar/Apr **2010**, Vol. 89, Issue 2

Lieber and Press provide a detailed analysis of how such an attack would have a more than 95 percent chance of destroying all of China's fixed silo-based intercontinental missiles, with less than 700 fatalities. (Much of this analysis is identical to the arguments made by the George W. Bush administration for its program to develop a low-yield nuclear bunker buster--a program ultimately blocked by Congress.) Yet there is no chance whatsoever that any U.S. president would launch such an attack--certainly not against China, nor even against a much less capable nuclear power. The challenge in modern warfare is not hitting a target at a known and fixed location; the challenge is to know the target's location. China's capabilities are not limited to the 20 land-based silos Lieber and Press confidently predict could be destroyed in a single attack--China also has mobile missiles, bombers, ships, and submarines. Do the Chinese believe the United States could destroy these mobile systems? Until recently, the United States overlooked an entire nuclear material processing facility in Iran. Washington does not know where North Korea stores its crude devices, nor for that matter where India, Israel, or Pakistan keeps its weapons. A nuclear weapon could even be hidden on a pleasure boat, tens of thousands of which traverse U.S. waterways each day. Nuclear-armed pleasure boats could never defeat the United States or prevent the ultimate defeat of an enemy that has them, but the possibility of their existence does make the idea of a totally disarming attack against an adversary's nuclear forces nonsense.

#### Strengthening the arsenal creates negative threat perceptions- changes in doctrine are not enough to reassure enemies

Keir A. **Lieber**, the author of War and the Engineers: The Primacy of Politics Over Technology, is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame. Daryl G. **Press**, the author of Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats, is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania China Security, Winter **2007**, pp.66 - 89 2007 World Security Institute http://www.chinasecurity.us/index.php?option=com\_content&view=article&id=189

Finally, the importance of the shift in the nuclear balance does not hinge on the U.S. willingness to launch a nuclear attack on Russia or China, let alone on an assumption that a nuclear strike against one of those countries is guaranteed to succeed. Chinese and Russian military planners pay close attention to changes in the U.S. arsenal and are likely to adjust their force levels, deployment patterns, and alert status accordingly. Just as American planners put greater stock in actual Chinese military capabilities than in China’s stated intentions, we assume that Chinese and Russian leaders pay more attention to changes in American military capabilities rather than the declarations from Washington about America’s goals and intentions. Therefore, even if the United States would never launch a preemptive nuclear strike, the pursuit of nuclear primacy should be expected to trigger a response among U.S. adversaries.

### Iran

#### No terrorist hand off

Waltz 2012 [Kenneth N. Waltz is Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Columbia University Jul/Aug 2012 Foreign Affairs Vol. 91, Issue 4 “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb” Ebsco]

As for the risk of a handoff to terrorists, no country could transfer nuclear weapons without running a high risk of being found out. U.S. surveillance capabilities would pose a serious obstacle, as would the United States' impressive and growing ability to identify the source of fissile material. Moreover, countries can never entirely control or even predict the behavior of the terrorist groups they sponsor. Once a country such as Iran acquires a nuclear capability, it will have every reason to maintain full control over its arsenal.¶ After all, building a bomb is costly and dangerous. It would make little sense to transfer the product of that investment to parties that cannot be trusted or managed.

## Grid

### Grid Resilient 2NC

#### Even if the grid will collapse in the short term, the plan at best solves in 20 years

Anderson 10—Senior Engineer in the Integrated Applications Office @ National Renewable Energy Laboratory [Kate Anderson “SMALL NUCLEAR REACTORS,” White Paper, February 1, 2010]

Despite these benefits, small reactors have many challenges to overcome. A few designs are in the engineering phase and could be commercialized within a decade, but most designs are still in the research stage, and will require extensive engineering and demonstration before they are ready to be commercialized. The unique design features that make small reactors appealing, like passive safety systems and integral designs, require non-traditional components that will need to be fully developed, tested, and demonstrated. Additional developments in instrumentation and control will be needed for most small reactor designs. Designs that depart from the traditional light water reactor technology may required significant material and fuel qualification as well, which could take 10-12 years or more.9 pg. 3-4

### Power Proj Irrelevant

#### Regional regimes solve hotspots- power projection is irrelevant

Joseph M. Parent Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami. Paul K. Macdonald is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Wellesley College. Nov/Dec 2011, Vol. 90, Issue 6 Foreign Affairs “The Wisdom of Retrenchment” Ebsco

Although Russia continues to meddle in its near abroad and has employed oil and gas embargoes to coerce its immediate neighbors, western Europe's resources are more than sufficient to counter an assertive Russia. A more autonomous Europe would take some time to develop a coherent security and defense policy and would not always see events through the same lens as Washington. But reducing Europe's dependence on the United States would create a strong incentive for European states to spend more on defense, modernize their forces, and better integrate their policies and capabilities. U.S. forces in the European theater could safely be reduced by 40-50 percent without compromising European security. Asia is also ready for a decreased U.S. military presence, and Washington should begin gradually withdrawing its troops. Although China has embarked on an ambitious policy of military modernization and engages in periodic saber rattling in the South China Sea, its ability to project power remains limited. Japan and South Korea are already shouldering greater defense burdens than they were during the Cold War. India, the Philippines, and Vietnam are eager to forge strategic partnerships with the United States. Given the shared interest in promoting regional security, these ties could be sustained through bilateral political and economic agreements, instead of the indefinite deployments and open-ended commitments of the Cold War. In the event that China becomes domineering, U.S. allies on its borders will act as a natural early warning system and a first line of defense, as well as provide logistical hubs and financial support for any necessary U.S. responses. Yet such a state of affairs is hardly inevitable. For now, there are many less expensive alternatives that can strengthen the current line of defense, such as technology transfers, arms sales, and diplomatic mediation. Defending the territorial integrity of Japan and South Korea and preventing Chinese or North Korean adventurism demands rapid-response forces with strong reserves, not the 30,000 soldiers currently stationed in each country. Phasing out 20 percent of those forces while repositioning others to Guam or Hawaii would achieve the same results more efficiently.

## Warming

### Impact D 2NC

#### Too late – current CO2 in the pipeline makes serious climate shifts inevitable for the next 1000 years

Jonathan M. Gitlin, January 27, 2009, “Study: too late to turn back the clock on climate change,” http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2009/01/study-too-late-to-turn-back-the-clock-on-climate-change.ars

This week's PNAS brings with it some bad news on the climate front: even if policy makers and the general public get on board with drastic CO2 emission cuts, it's already too late to prevent serious changes to the planet's climate, and those changed will be remarkably persistent. Those are the findings of a group of researchers from the US, Switzerland, and France. In their paper, they look at the effect of increasing CO2 over millennial time frames, and it's worrisome stuff. Currently, CO2 levels in the atmosphere are around 385 ppm, a 35 percent increase over pre-industrial levels. The most optimistic scenarios arrive at a figure of 450 ppm as the best we might be able to achieve in the coming decades, but even at that level, changes in precipitation patterns, temperature increases, and a rise in sea level appear to be locked in for at least the next thousand years.

#### Climate change doesn’t collapse the economy or cause conflict

Thomas Bernauera et al (Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS) and Institute for Environmental Decisions (IED) and b University of Bern Department of Economics and Oeschger Institute for Climate Change Research) 2010 “Climate Change, Economic Growth, and Conflict” http://climsec.prio.no/papers/Climate\_Conflict\_BKKR\_Trondheim\_2010.pdf

Despite many claims by high-ranking policy-makers and some scientists that climate change breeds violent conflict, the existing empirical literature has so far not been able to identify a systematic, causal relationship of this kind. This may either reflect de facto absence of such a relationship, or it may be the consequence of theoretical and methodological limitations of existing work. We revisit the climate–conflict issue along two lines. First, at the theoretical level we specify the mechanism through which climate change is likely to affect the risk of armed conflict. We focus on the causal chain linking climatic conditions, economic growth, and armed conflict, and also argue that the growth–conflict part of this chain is contingent on political system characteristics. Second, at the methodological level we develop an approach that takes care of endogeneity problems in the climate–economy–conflict relationship. We test our theoretical argument on a global data set for 1950-2004. The results show that the climate change–conflict hypothesis rests on rather shaky empirical foundations:

we do find some negative effects of climate change on economic growth, while stronger economic growth is associated with a lower probability of civil conflict. But the climate change effect on growth is not robust to changes in climate indicators and samples. Our results also show that non-democratic countries are more likely to experience armed conflict when economic conditions deteriorate. Our results suggest that investing in climate-friendly economic growth and democracy can qualify as a no-regrets strategy.